1AC

**Contention 1 is Domestic Violence** causes massive death, sexual abuse, and suffering. NCADV:[[1]](#footnote-1)

Domestic violence is the willful intimidation, physical assault, battery, sexual assault, and/or other abusive behavior perpetrated by an intimate partner against another. It is an epidemic affecting individuals in every community, regardless of age, economic status, race, religion, nationality or educational background. Violence against women [It] is often accompanied by emotionally abusive and controlling behavior, and thus is part of a systematic pattern of dominance and control. Domestic violence [It] results in physical injury, psychological trauma, and sometimes death. The consequences of domestic violence can cross generations and truly last a lifetime. One in every four women will experience domestic violence in her lifetime. 1 An estimated 1.3 million women are victims of physical assault by an intimate partner each year. 2 85% of domestic violence victims are women. 3 Historically, females have been most often victimized by someone they knew. 4 Females who are 20-24 years of age are at the greatest risk of nonfatal intimate partner violence. 5 Most cases of domestic violence are never reported to the police. 6 Witnessing violence between one’s parents or caretakers is the strongest risk factor of transmitting violent behavior from one generation to the next. 7 Boys who witness domestic violence are twice as likely to abuse their own partners and children when they become adults. 8 30% to 60% of perpetrators of intimate partner violence also abuse children in the household. 9 One in 6 women and 1 in 33 men have experienced an attempted or completed rape. 10 Nearly 7.8 million women have been raped by an intimate partner at some point in their lives. 11 Sexual assault or forced sex occurs in approximately 40-45% of battering relationships. 12 1 in 12 women and 1 in 45 men have been stalked in their lifetime. 13 81% of women stalked by a current or former intimate partner are also physically assaulted by that partner; 31% are also sexually assaulted by that partner. 13 Almost one-third of female homicide victims that are reported in police records are killed by an intimate partner. 14 In 70-80% of intimate partner homicides, no matter which partner was killed, the man physically abused the woman before the murder. 12 Less than one-fifth of victims reporting an injury from intimate partner violence sought medical treatment following the injury. 15 Intimate partner violence results in more than 18.5 million mental health care visits each year. 16 The cost of intimate partner violence exceeds $5.8 billion each year, $4.1 billion of which is for direct medical and mental health services. 17 Victims of intimate partner violence lost almost 8 million days of paid work because of the violence perpetrated against them by current or former husbands, boyfriends and dates. This loss is the equivalent of more than 32,000 full-time jobs and almost 5.6 million days of household productivity as a result of violence. 17 There are 16,800 homicides and $2.2 million (medically treated) injuries due to intimate partner violence annually, which costs $37 billion. 18 Domestic violence is one of the most chronically underreported crimes. 20 Only approximately one-quarter of all physical assaults, one-fifth of all rapes, and one-half of all stalkings perpetuated against females by intimate partners are reported to the police. 1 Approximately 20% of the 1.5 million people who experience intimate partner violence annually obtain civil protection orders. 1 Approximately one-half of the orders obtained by women against intimate partners who physically assaulted them were violated. 1 More than two-thirds of the restraining orders against intimate partners who raped or stalked the victim were violated.

Domestic violence spills over to affect the security of all women in society. **Seith**:[[2]](#footnote-2)

Violence is used against women as a form of social control and is effective because it ‘captures the essence of male dominance–female submission.’ Systematic subordination occurs when domestic violence pervades a particular culture or society. Stereotypical subordinate roles for women are reinforced by violence–a cycle which perpetuates itself when men initiate abuse against women on the basis of deviations from those stereotypes. This violence is gender-motivated because ‘the perpetrator seeks to punish the victim in order to further subordinate the victim’s group based on negative views of them.’ The target of such subordination is not purely, or even principally, the individual woman; all women are targeted and subsequently injured by such subordination. Thus, when domestic violence occurs, it also functions as societal reinforcement of male power; physical and sexual violence is the manifestation of the power that men use to maintain control over women.

**Thus, I advocate that it be morally permissible for victims to use deadly force as a deliberate response to repeated domestic violence. I reserve the right to clarify.**

**Contention 2 is Deterring Abuse**

**1.** Deadly force works and solves abuse. **Thompson et al**:[[3]](#footnote-3)

We also conducted two parallel multivariate logistic regression models to determine whether selfprotective behavior reduced the risk of both minor injuries (i.e., bruises, cuts, scratches, swellings, chipped teeth) and severe injuries (i.e., knife or stab wounds, gunshot wounds, broken bones or teeth, internal injuries, unconsciousness). Consistent with NCVS coding, for "unspecified injuries," women with hospital stays of 0-2 days were classified as incurring minor injuries, and those with hospital stays of greater than 2 days were classified as incurring severe injuries. A woman's use of self-protective behavior significantly reduced her risk of incurring a minor injury (adjusted odds ratio (AOR) = 0.42, 95 percent confidence interval (CI): 0.30, 0.57). Although the use of self-protective behaviors also [and] reduced the odds that a woman incurred a severe injury, this was not statistically significant (AOR = 0.64, 95 percent CI: 0.29, 1.38). In the final model for the self-protective-traditional measure, self-protective behaviors continued to manifest a positive, but statistically nonsignificant, effect on risk of injury. A similar pattern emerged for the other covariates. Relationship status, victim's education, and offender weapon use were the only significant risk factors for injury. The nature of their effects on injury risk were similar to their effects in the model with the self-protective-revised measure. Women who engaged in self-protective behaviors were also asked whether they believed any of their actions helped the situation in any way and whether any of their actions made the situation worse in any way (women could indicate that the self-protective behavior helped the situation and that the self-protective behavior made the situation worse, so these variables were not mutually exclusive). Seventy-five percent of women who engaged in a self-protective behavior reported that their use of self-protective behaviors) helped the situation. Of these women, 57 percent reported that the behavior(s) was helpful in avoiding injury or greater injury, 21 percent reported that the self-protective behaviors) helped scare or chase the offender off, 25 percent reported that the behavior(s) helped them get away from the offender, 7 percent reported that the behavior helped them protect other people, and 16 percent reported that the behaviors) helped the situation in some other way.

But, even if this study is flawed, no neg study evaluates deadly force—all of their studies are specific to things like aggression or resistance, but absent specificity their evidence doesn’t apply because by definition deadly force kills or at least incapacitates.

And, deadly force outweighs the death of the abuser because the abuser being alive only increases the violence. Even if life is a prerequisite to other moral entitlements, that assumes the individual life in question pursues net beneficial entitlements, but in the case of the abuser all they do is increase the violence.

**2.** Deadly force deters abuse and incites reform. **Zipursky**:[[4]](#footnote-4)

A similar argument applies with regard to the possibility of more pervasive physical and psychological forms of domination. What is at stake, in this regard, is not only physical security, but, as Jane Cohen has pointed out, liberty of thought, speech, movement, and sexuality. Physical domination is an instrument for the elimination of these forms of liberty, and for the elimination of psychological independence and well-being. And one particularly important enhancement of the physical domination is the elimination of the dominated woman's access to outside help. **If** use of **deadly force** in no-access situations **were permitted**, then it would arguably be the case that: (1) she[victims] **would increase** her [their] **ability to avert death or injury** in the sort of “no-access” case that does frequently arise in these scenarios; (2) to the extent that her sense of lack of liberty and helplessness were based on actual condition,she might experience a greater sense of liberty because, if access has truly been cut off, she will have the right to defend herself; and (3) **the assailant could no longer count on being able to** rape and **terrorize [the victim]** her by cutting off access and engaging in brutal conduct **without facing the risk of defensive homicide** (a risk that would presumably increase substantially if such defensive homicide were legal). Perhaps this fact would diminish the terrorizing conduct and the cutting off of access. With regard to both forms of domination I have considered, it might also be added that **society might change so that access** for women **to alternative paths of relief were more available** than it now is. **If the cost to society of no-access scenarios were women killing men without** criminal **liability, the state might be more motivated to provide alternative avenues for relief.** This provision of access would arguably enhance women's security.

3. Deadly force is key to criminal justice reform. **Clark**:[[5]](#footnote-5)

The criminal justice system already effectively deals with domestic violence culminating in murder. Fortunately, people take murder seriously, even when it occurs in a domestic setting. Unfortunately, however, murder within the family is not usually seen as the predictable end of domestic violence. 81 If it were so seen, criminal prosecution of abusers would be common. The use of vigorous criminal prosecution in cases where domestic violence has not yet reached murderous consequences would reduce the number of such murders, both those committed by unchecked abusers and those committed by desperate victims who see no other available protection for themselves.

**Contention 3 is Only Deadly Force Solves**

1. Leaving the abuser causes more harm—deadly force is the safest option. **Koons**:[[6]](#footnote-6)

Battering, as experienced by many women, is distorted when read through doctrines such as imminence. In the context of the killing of a battering man by a woman, imminence is a confused doctrine. While it purports to be based simply on the passage of time, imminence actually reflects subjective social norms, such as that a woman who lives with a battering man "should have left" the room, the house, or the relationship. Infused with suppositions about gender roles and behavior, imminence often functions as a retreat rule to enforce unspoken societal assumptions that women should leave battering relationships before episodes of violence take place. Yet, requiring retreat, in whatever form, exposes women to greater danger of abuse. The unworkability of a retreat rule is manifest when considering the phenomenon of separation assault. Legal scholars have defined separation assault as "the attack on the woman's body and volition in which her partner keeps her from leaving, retaliates for the separation, or forces her to return." The concept of separation assault recognizes that patterns of violence, already dramatic, often increase upon a woman's separation from a battering man. According to the Department of Justice, seventy-five percent of assaults occur when the abused party is divorced or separated from the abuser. Another study indicates that forty-five percent of murders of women arise out of a man's "rage over the actual or impending estrangement from his partner." Women who are separated from their spouses are three times more likely to be attacked than divorced women and twenty-five times more likely to be attacked than married women.

And, literally every study with every control variable is consistent with the view that the majority of victims who use deadly force do so out of self-defense. Hagen:[[7]](#footnote-7)

Studies by Saunders (1986) and Hamberger and Potente (1994) suggest that the vast majority of women who use severe violence do so out of self-defense. Additional motivations for violence may be retaliation for previous violence or anticipation of imminent violence directed at them by their partners. Busey (1993b, cited in Healey, Smith, and O’Sullivan, 1998) categorizes women who engage in violence into subgroups: [A.] Self-defending victims engage in violence to defend themselves and escape from the violence directed toward them; they have histories of victimization and multiple injuries. This group appears to represent[s] the majority of women arrested for domestic violence. [B] Angry victims have a long history of being abused by partners and during childhood. They fight back to avoid being victims again. [C] Primary physical aggressors represent about 2 percent of the women arrested. These women initiate the violence and injure their male partners. [D] Mutually combatant women are in situations in which both partners inflict injuries. This group of women is estimated to represent about 2 percent of those arrested.

2. Police and law enforcement fail to respond 90 percent of the time. **Wimberly**:[[8]](#footnote-8)

Empirical, historical, and sociological evidence should be used by experts to show that the necessity of a battered woman’s actions in self-defense is in large part created by societal pressures that demand that women stay in the home, and submit to the domination of men. For instance, an expert could demonstrate how the assumptions of the law and subsequently of law enforcement officials reflect the social norms that compel women to silently and privately cope with domestic abuse. As Caroline Forell and Donna Matthews wrote, “[T]he law is often ineffectual. For example, in a [1994] U.S. Department of Justice study, Marianne Zawitz estimated that nearly **90 percent of women killed by intimates had previously called the police, and** that **half of these had called five or more times.”** 78 Professor Raeder similarly found, “The statistics produced from myriad sources are disconcerting, even with some discounting for methodological objections. Each year nearly 1500 women are killed by their batterers. Approximately ninety percent of women killed by husbands or boyfriends were stalked and had previously called the police.” 79 **Women** who have been **victimized by their intimate partners** may **have tried, and failed, to get help from the police.** According to Gillespie, “Many women who have ultimately killed violent mates tell of their inability to get police protection.” 80 She continues: If she is like the overwhelming majority of battered women, she also knows, firsthand, that she cannot rely on the police, the courts, neighbors, relatives, or anyone else for protection against her violent mate. Every attempt to get help is likely only to reinforce her perception that she has no alternative but to protect herself. 81 This “don’t ask, don’t tell” mentality demonstrates a societal preference for **idealized notions of the family** over protection of the woman. This preference **prevent**s **women from seeking protection from** the very **public agencies** that were created to help victims of abuse. As Julie Blackman explains, “[P]rotective agencies and interventionist policies more generally must ‘swim upstream’ against the flow of attitudes that give biological parents and marital bonds far more credit than they deserve.” 82

Also, to treat oneself as an end requires defending oneself from aggression. Being an end allows us to dispose of our contingent ends like our occupations or hobbies, but not of our person. Thus, being an end permits one to protect oneself against aggressors. The justification is not to save my own life, but to resist the misuse of my life as the life of a rational agent. Generic deontological arguments against killing apply only to maxims of convenience killing, in which we kill for the intent of achieving some self-interested end. Because the intent of deadly force in response to repeated domestic violence is to protect oneself, arguments about victims using aggressors as mere means do not apply.

**Contention 4 is International Security**

Women security against gender violence is the internal link to global stability—solves a litany of global impacts. **Hudson 4/24**:[[9]](#footnote-9)

Well, here is some robust empirical evidence that we cannot ignore: Using the largest extant database on the status of women in the world today, which I created with three colleagues, we found that there is a strong and highly significant link between state security and women's security. In fact, the very best predictor of a state's peacefulness is not its level of wealth, its level of democracy, or its ethno-religious identity; the best predictor of a state's peacefulness is how well its women are treated. What's more, democracies with higher levels of violence against women are as insecure and unstable as nondemocracies. Our findings, detailed in our new book out this month, Sex and World Peace, echo those of other scholars, who have found that the larger the gender gap between the treatment of men and women in a society, the more likely a country is to be involved in intra-and interstate conflict, to be the first to resort to force in such conflicts, and to resort to higher levels of violence. On issues of national health, economic growth, corruption, and social welfare, the best predictors are also those that reflect the situation of women. What happens to women affects the security, stability, prosperity, bellicosity, corruption, health, regime type, and (yes) the power of the state. The days when one could claim that the situation of women had nothing to do with matters of national or international security are, frankly, over. The empirical results to the contrary are just too numerous and too robust to ignore. But as we look around at the world, the situation of women is anything but secure. Our database rates countries based on several categories of women's security from 0 (best) to 4 (worst).

International stability solves nuclear war—interstate aggression with the nuclear option means there is always a risk—only way to avoid extinction. **Morgan**:[[10]](#footnote-10)

Besides the accidental factor, another factor that could incite nuclear war is that of aggression. When nuclear powers are involved in wars of aggression, the nuclear option is always available. Especially when a nuclear power explicitly states that ‘‘all options are on the table,’’ concern about the nuclear option is well founded. Thus, Moore defines the aggressive factor as when ‘‘one or more nations decide to use weapons against a nuclear or non-nuclear nation in order to promote an economic, political or military goal, as part of an ongoing war or as a first strike nuclear attack. (The state, of course, may claim it is a pre- emptive, retaliatory or even accidental attack.)’’ [10].5 Especially in light of the recent U.S. attack on Iraq (ideologically based on Bush’s preventative war doctrine), the ‘‘pre-emptive’’ factor in instigating a nuclear war should be taken seriously. It is when one or more nations believe, whether correctly or incorrectly, or claims to believe ‘‘that another nuclear nation is about to use nuclear weapons against its nuclear, military, industrial or civilian targets and preemptively attacks that nation.’’

And, ethical agnosticism should lead us to default towards preventing extinction as a meta-constraint on all ethical theories. Since we presently lack definitive grounds for believing any particular moral theory, we should default to rules, which maximize our ability to continue to engage in moral reasoning and chance of finding demonstrable moral truths. Bostrom:[[11]](#footnote-11)

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest[s] an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our [that our] present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.

And, normative uncertainty demands that we take existential risks seriously even under non-consequentialist ethical frameworks provided only that we assign some form of consequentialism a non-zero credence. Bostrom 2:[[12]](#footnote-12)

There will be some types of putative existential risks for which the main uncertainty is evaluative and others where the main uncertainty is descriptive (e.g., how likely an event is to occur or what consequences it would have). With regard to descriptive uncertainty, we saw earlier that if something is not known to be objectively safe, it is risky, at least in the subjective sense relevant to decision making. We can make a parallel move with regard to normative uncertainty. Suppose that some event X would reduce biodiversity. Suppose (for the sake of illustration) it is known that X [but] would have no other significant consequences and that the reduced biodiversity would not affect humans or any other morally considerable beings. Now, we may be uncertain whether biodiversity has final value (is valuable “for its own sake”). Hence we may be uncertain [and hence] about whether or not X would really be bad. But we can say that if we are not sure whether or not X would really be bad (but we are sure that X would not be good), then X is bad in at least the subjective sense relevant to decision making.

Thus, any argument for discounting the moral value of future lives or the badness of extinction would have to achieve an impossibly high-justified credence level to overwhelm the magnitude of ethical risk of extinction. This also preempts skepticism since any degree of moral risk generates a normative reason to act in the absence of competing reasons.

I value **Morality**. Epistemology comes before all other ethical foundations because labeling things moral or immoral is just a function of our knowledge. We need to know *how* we know what right and wrong are before we can pick the best definition.

**And**, a priori reasoning is impossible so the only epistemologically sound basis for Morality is experience. **Schwartz**:[[13]](#footnote-13)

The empirical support for the fundamental principle of empiricism is diffuse but salient. Our common empirical experience and experimental psychology offer evidence that humans do not have any capacity to garner knowledge except by empirical sources. The fact is that we believe that there is no source of knowledge, information, or evidence apart from observation, empirical scientific investigations, and our sensory experience of the world, and we believe this on the basis of our empirical a posteriori experiences and our general empirical view of how things work. For example, we believe on empirical evidence that humans are continuous with the rest of nature and that we rely like other animals on our senses to tell us how things are. If humans are more successful than other animals, it is not because we possess special non-experiential ways of knowing, but because we are better at cooperating, collating, and inferring. In particular we do not have any capacity for substantive a priori knowledge. There is no known mechanism by which such knowledge would be made possible. This is an empirical claim.

**Next**, all humans experience the badness of pain and the goodness of pleasure. **Nagel**:[[14]](#footnote-14)

I shall defend the unsurprising claim that **sensory pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter whose they are.** The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just [is a] sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure as subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism. What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasons are no good, then it is at least possible that I have a reason, and not just an inclination, to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove. But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. He would still have involuntary avoidance reactions, otherwise it would be hard to say that he felt pain at all. And he would be motivated to reduce pain for other reasons—because it was an effective way to avoid the danger being signaled, or because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to him. He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. No objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases. There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.

Thus, because each agent values their own pleasure, they must also value the pleasure of others. Sayre-McCord:[[15]](#footnote-15)

According to the second argument, the evaluative starting point is again each person thinking "my own happiness is valuable," but this fact about each person is taken as evidence, with respect to each bit of happiness that is valued, that that bit is valuable. Each person is seen as ha[s]ving reason to think that the happiness she enjoys is valuable, and reason to think of others -- given that they are in a parallel situation with respect to the happiness they enjoy -- that each person's happiness is such that there is the same evidence available to each for the value of the happiness that another person enjoys as there is for the value of one's own happiness. If happiness is such that every piece of it is desired by someone, then it seems as if, in taking ourselves to have reason to see the bit we value as valuable, we are committed to acknowledging the value of all the rest.

**Therefore**, **the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.** Prefer this standard:

**1.** The act-omission distinction doesn’t exist—every inaction is an action itself, so we’re equally responsible for omissions. **Rachels**:[[16]](#footnote-16)

So what is the difference between causing and allowing? What real difference is marked by those words? The most obvious ways of attempting to draw the distinction [between doing and allowing] won’t work. For example, suppose we say it is the difference between action and inaction--when we cause an outcome, we do something, but when we merely allow it to happen, we passively stand by and do nothing. This won’t work because, when we allow something to happen, we do perform at least one act: the act of allowing it to happen. The problem is that the distinction between doing something and not doing something is relative to the specification of what is or is not done--if I allow someone to die, I do not save him, but I do let him die. It is tempting to say the difference between action and inaction is the difference between moving one’s body and not moving one’s body; but that does not help. When we allow something to happen, we are typically moving our bodies in all sorts of ways. If I allow you to die by running away, I may be moving my body very rapidly.

If there is no act-omission distinction, then we are fully complicit with any harms we allow, so actions are moral if they minimize harm.

**2.** Absolute standards are logically incoherent since they produce insolvable conflicts between moral duties. For instance, if I assume a debt that I become unable to pay, I can either break my promise to pay the debt, or steal the money from someone else, both of which would violate moral rules, making action both required and forbidden, which is contradictory. Consequentialist standards let us hierarchically order any list of potential acts in terms of some desired outcome.

Next, **Edwards** contextualizes domestic violence:[[17]](#footnote-17)

As a survivor of domestic violence, I have often been disturbed at the popular beliefs and misconceptions surrounding the experience of abuse. Leaving aside stereotypes for the moment, I want to focus on the phenomenon of “mutual domestic violence”. I have heard this term [has been] used to describe physical fights between couples, a term which insinuates that both combatants are on equal ground and equally to blame. However, “fighting” is not the same as domestic violence. Domestic violence can, but doesn’t necessarily have to include physical violence. What differentiates domestic violence, or abuse, from fighting is that domestic violence involves an ongoing pattern of attempts by one person to control and dominate the other person. “Mutual domestic violence” does not exist. The word “mutual” implies equality and a sense that the two parties are on common ground. In the case of domestic violence, there is no “mutuality”. Through beatings, sexual abuse, and emotional/verbal abuse, one person exercises control over another person and maintains it through force, credible threat of force, or tactics such as isolating them from family/friends, monitoring their private correspondence or movements, or preventing them from access to money or material resources. There is nothing “two-sided” about it. Abuse, or domestic violence, is characterized by a context of coercive control and a variety of tactics designed to weaken, confuse, hurt, and frighten the victim. These tactics may or may not involve physical violence. The violence can be sexual, mental, emotional, verbal, or psychological. Often, the physical violence doesn’t come until the cycle of abuse is firmly entrenched in the relationship. All kinds of abuse, whether or not they leave bruises, are harmful to sufferers and a violation of their rights and boundaries. Abuse is used to control a victim and convince her that nothing bad is happening or that she is the one who caused the violence. Over time, she can cease to trust her own perceptions and be reluctant or afraid to reach out for help. She may think that no one would believe her, fear she would lose custody of her children, or believe that her partner would prevent her from escaping or retaliate in some way. This is not a relationship of mutuality or equality. They are equal as human beings; however one person is resorting to vicious, manipulative tactics to disorient and dominate his victim and using force or threat of force against her if she challenges him. Calling every instance in which a couple resorts to physical fighting as “domestic violence” detracts from the brutal realities of abuse and the impact that it has on a victim both during the relationship and in the aftermath. If the term “domestic violence” is used to describe everything ranging from a one-time shoving match to a long-term ongoing cycle of beatings and control tactics, it loses its meaning. It is important to differentiate an abusive relationship where a variety of tactics are used by one person to control, manipulate, and hurt another from a physically combative relational style. A relationship can involve physical fighting but not necessarily be abusive because of the lack of coercion and control. One person isn’t using physical violence and coercive tactics to control the other person’s life and interactions. A couple may physically fight every now and then but for the most part have a relationship of mutuality and equality where one isn’t exerting and enforcing control over the other. In the case of domestic violence, the establishment and enforcement of control is constant, omnipresent, and all-encompassing. There is never a moment in which this dynamic does not exist. Certainly there can be times of calm and even happiness, but those times all too quickly give way to tension building phases and then explosions, often for no reason at all. But even in the times of apparent peace and tranquility, the abuser’s desire for control and dominance is still simmering beneath the surface. Eventually it will explode, often for no apparent reason at all. The woman may not even see it coming until it is too late. The lived experience of domestic violence confers an invisibility upon the victim. She is isolated from others and becomes increasingly alienated from herself, unable to trust her own perceptions, and having no one who can give her a desperately needed outside perspective and validation. She is even more invisible if her injuries do not show or if she is forced to pretend that everything is fine. She is invisible to her abuser as a human being, a person deserving of bodily integrity, respect, and dignity. When her experience is trivialized as “mutual” and referred to as “fighting”, she is further diminished. Deep down she knows what she is enduring is more than just “fighting”. A punch or two hurts a lot less than living in a situation where one is under constant surveillance, forbidden to see family and friends, denied access to money or other necessities of life, subjected to insults, public humiliation, and accusations, and living with the constant threat of harm to self or children. Domestic violence is a reality where the rules are everchanging and the retaliations are unpredictable. It is degrading, painful, traumatizing, disorienting, frightening, lonely, and dehumanizing. In this reality, there are no equals. There is no mutuality.

Finally, Presume aff since the aff is at a structural disadvantage empirically verified by win percentage. In a sample of 110 triples and doubles rounds from VBT, Berkeley, and Harvard, the affs won only 31 percent of the time. Neg skew on THIS topic is empirically proven because the triples and doubles rounds are the rounds with the largest disparities between talent. Thus, if the round comes out even I’ve done the better debating. Prefer presumption arguments based on fairness since a) fairness is a gateway issue, and b) if presumption becomes an issue it means the truth debate has become a wash.

PATRIARCHY ADVANTAGE

**Contention 3 is Patriarchy**

1. Deadly force solves patriarchy. Mandating that the victim take some other option or avoid the violence just re-entrenches patriarchy. It’s try or die for the aff. Gelderloos:[[18]](#footnote-18)

But a pacifist practice that forbids the use of any other tactics leaves no option for people who need to protect themselves from violence now. In the case of rape and other forms of violence against women, nonviolence implies the same lessons that patriarchy has taught for millennia. It glorifies passivity, "turning the other cheek," and "dignified suffering" among the oppressed. In one of the most lucid texts defining the preservation and implementation of patriarchy—the Old Testament—story upon commandment upon parable upon law counsel women to suffer injustice patiently and pray for the divine Authority to intervene. (This prescription is remarkably similar to pacifists' faith in the corporate media to disseminate images of dignified suffering and motivate the "decision-making authority" to implement justice). Because patriarchy clearly prescribes a one-sided male violence, women would be disrupting this power dynamic, not reinforcing it, by relearning their propensity for violence." To reiterate, women reclaiming the ability and right to use force would not by itself end patriarchy, but it is a necessary condition for gender liberation, as well as a useful form of empowerment and protection in the short term.

2. The aff is the key internal link to cultural spillover to solve patriarchy. Heberle:[[19]](#footnote-19)

Further, when women who are battered act violently in self-defense it becomes news. It becomes a story about an innocent woman being victimized who, out of irrational desperation, strikes back and happens to kill her abuser. Encouraging stories of successful prevention and resistance as reasonable and necessary rather than as only desperate and irrational can lead to increased knowledge about the contradictions and fissures in the logic of the rape script and contribute to the general deconstruction of identifications of women with real sexual vulnerability and men with real sexual power.

Patriarchy leads to extinction. **Reardon**:[[20]](#footnote-20)

In an article entitled “Naming the Cultural Forces That Push Us toward War” (1983), Charlene Spretnak focused on some of the fundamental cultural factors that deeply influence ways of thinking about security. She argues that patriarchy encourages militarist tendencies. Since a major war now could easily bring on massive annihilation of almost unthinkable proportions, why are discussions in our national forums addressing the madness of the nuclear arms race limited to matters of hardware and statistics? A more comprehensive analysis is badly needed . . . A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay—all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used. (Spretnak 1983)

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